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Abstract
When the primary outcome is difficult to collect, surrogate endpoint is typ-
ically used as a substitute. It is possible that for every individual, treatment
has a positive effect on surrogate, and surrogate has a positive effect on pri-
mary outcome, but for some individuals, treatment has a negative effect on
primary outcome. For example, a treatment may be substantially effective in
preventing the stroke for everyone, and lowering the risk of stroke is univer-
sally beneficial for a longer survival time, however, the treatment may still
causes death for some individuals. We define such paradoxical phenomenon as
individual surrogate paradox. The individual surrogate paradox is proposed
to capture the treatment effect heterogeneity, which is unable to be described
by either the surrogate paradox based on average causal effect (ACE) (Chen
et al., 2007) or that based on distributional causal effect (DCE) (Ju and Geng,
2010). We investigate existing surrogate criteria in terms of whether the indi-
vidual surrogate paradox could manifest. We find that only the strong binary
surrogate can avoid such paradox without additional assumptions. Utilizing
the sharp bounds, we propose novel criteria to exclude the individual surrogate
paradox. Our methods are illustrated in an application to determine the effect
of the intensive glycemia on the risk of development or progression of diabetic
retinopathy.
keywords: Biomarkers; Heterogeneity; Individual surrogate paradox; Surrogate
endpoints.
1 Introduction
To reduce costs and durations of studies and to facilitate collection, a surrogate
endpoint or a biomarker is typically used as a substitute for the primary endpoint. For
example, in a cancer trial, the primary outcome is elimination of symptomatic disease
or reduction in mortality, and a surrogate endpoint can be chosen as the presence of
cancer shown by biopsy during follow up (Fleming and Demets, 1996). In medicine
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and social sciences, it is critical to choose a good surrogate endpoint since a bad
surrogate would result in misleading or severe consequences (Gordon, 1995; Moore,
1997). For example, while being effective in reducing the risk for arrythmia, anti-
arrythmia drug Tamnbocor directly caused the death of over 50,000 people (Moore,
1997).
Various criteria have been proposed to evaluate the use of surrogate endpoint
(Buyse and Molenberghs, 1998; Buyse et al., 2000; Daniels and Hughes, 1997; Molen-
berghs et al., 2001; Freedman et al., 1992). The Prentice criterion (Prentice, 1989)
requires the treatment to be independent with the primary endpoint conditional on
surrogate. However, the Prentice criterion might not satisfy the property of causal
necessity, that is, the absence of the treatment effect on the surrogate may not in-
dicate the absence of the treatment effect on the primary outcome (Frangakis and
Rubin, 2002). The principal surrogate criterion was proposed by Frangakis and Ru-
bin (2002) to satisfy the causal necessity and it is further investigated by Elliott
et al. (2013); Conlon et al. (2014); Gilbert et al. (2008); Huang and Gilbert (2011);
Wolfson and Gilbert (2010). Pearl and Bareinboim (2010) demonstrated that the
principal surrogacy criterion still cannot guarantee a surrogate to be a good predictor
of the treatment effect on the outcome. Lauritzen (2004) proposed a strong surrogate
criterion, which is the treatment affects the primary outcome only through the sur-
rogate endpoint. The strong surrogates satisfy causal necessity and are also principal
surrogates.
In recent years, these criteria have been scrutinized from the perspective of whether
paradoxical result would manifest. As a minimal requirement, inference based on a
good surrogate endpoint should provide at least the correct sign, if not the accu-
rate magnitude, of the treatment effect on the primary outcome. Chen et al. (2007)
pointed out that all of the above criteria suffer from the surrogate paradox based
on average causal effect (ACE). That is, for a surrogate that has a positive ACE on
the true endpoint, a positive ACE of treatment on the surrogate may still result in a
negative ACE of treatment on the primary outcome. Such paradoxical phenomenon
happens even in randomized control trials. The authors further proposed criterion to
exclude the surrogate paradox based on ACE (Chen et al., 2007). Ju and Geng (2010)
demonstrated that a surrogate which can avoid the surrogate paradox based on ACE
may still encounter the surrogate paradox in the distributional sense. Based on this,
they introduced the surrogate paradox based on distributional causal effect (DCE),
where the ACE was replaced with a distributional causal effect, i.e., the difference be-
tween the cumulative distribution functions of the two potential outcomes. They also
proposed criteria to exclude the surrogate paradox based on DCE. More discussion
of the two surrogate paradoxes can be found in Wu et al. (2011) and VanderWeele
(2013).
However, the paradoxes based on both ACE and DCE quantify the causal relation-
ship between variables using population measures: average causal effect for the former
and difference between distributions of potential outcomes for the latter. Thus, both
paradoxes focus on the performance of surrogate endpoint in the entire population
rather than reflecting the individual status. The differences between individuals in
underlying pathology, biology or genetics can lead to drastically heterogeneous surro-
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gate performance. For a good surrogate, if every individual gets a beneficial treatment
effect on surrogate and a beneficial surrogate effect on the primary endpoint, then
it is expected that the no individuals would get a harmful treatment effect on the
primary endpoint. More generally, the conclusion of beneficial treatment effect for
majority of individuals based on surrogate endpoint should also apply to majority of
individuals in terms of primary endpoint. Otherwise, we say the individual surrogate
paradox manifests. For example, consider a study of Warfarin therapy, where pre-
vention of stroke is the surrogate endpoint and the survival is the primary outcome
(Borosak et al., 2004). It is found that Warfarin therapy is clinically substantially
effective in the primary and secondary prevention of stroke related to non-rheumatic
atrial fibrillation, however, a proportion of patients may experience the major risk
of bleeding, which can cause significant morbidity or mortality. Hence, it is possible
that the majority of individuals have a reduced risk on stroke due to treatment while
the treatment still causes death to a subgroup of them. The individual surrogate
paradox manifests in this case.
The exclusion of individual surrogate paradox is challenging. First of all, infer-
ence on the proportion of individuals benefitted or get harmed by the treatment is in
general harder than that of the average treatment effect since the former involves the
joint distribution of potential outcomes (Yin et al., 2017a). In randomization studies,
the average treatment effect is easily obtained by comparing the average responses
between treatment and control groups but the proportion of individuals benefitted
or harmed by the treatment is still not identifiable (Gadbury et al., 2004). Tech-
nically, if all the effect modifiers and confounders are collected and the mechanism
of how treatment affects the surrogate and primary outcome is correctly modeled,
then all the effects are homogeneous within the subgroups and the individual sur-
rogate paradox could be avoided by making inference within subgroups. However,
in a case where surrogate is typically used, the underlying mechanism of the disease
is unknown. Thus, it is hard to pin point or even observe all the critical factors.
Furthermore, even when both the ACE and DCE surrogate paradoxes are absent,
the individual surrogate paradox can still manifest in both randomized trials and
observational studies.
In this paper, we propose the individual surrogate paradox. As mentioned above,
a good surrogate should avoid the individual surrogate paradox. Hence, the inves-
tigation of the individual surrogate paradox provides an individual perspective to
evaluate the surrogate variables. We investigate whether the individual surrogate
paradox could manifest under the existing criteria. We found that among all the
existing methods, only the strong binary surrogate can avoid the individual surro-
gate paradox without additional assumptions while other methods cannot exclude
the paradox even for binary surrogate. Based on sharp bounds of the harm rate,
we provide new criteria to exclude the paradox and incorporate a generalized causal
necessity assumption to further boost power.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we define individual surrogate
paradox. In Section 3, we explore existing criteria on their ability to exclude the indi-
vidual surrogate paradox. In Section 4, we propose new criteria to exclude or confirm
the presence of individual surrogate paradox, and in Section 5, we demonstrate our
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criteria through data analysis. In Section 6, we present a brief discussion.
2 Preliminaries
Let T denote the randomized treatment variable, Y the outcome and S the surrogate.
Although the treatment is randomized, the relationship between the surrogate and the
primary outcome may in general still be confounded. Let W denote the unmeasured
confounder between the surrogate S and the outcome Y . We restrict T to be binary
throughout the paper. Let T = 1 denote the active treatment and T = 0 denote the
placebo. Let St denote the potential outcome of surrogate if the treatment was set to
T = t, and Yts denote the potential outcome of the primary endpoint if the treatment
and the surrogate were set to T = t and S = s by an external intervention on T and
S. We may also use the notation that YT=t = YtSt as the potential primary outcome
when the intervention is only to set T = t. Without loss of generality, we assume for
both S and Y , that the larger values correspond to the better results.
Let HR(T → S) = P (S0−S1 > 0) denote the harm rate of treatment T on surro-
gate endpoint S, i.e., the proportion of individuals who have a worse surrogate end-
point under treatment versus control. Similarly, let HR(T → Y ) = P (Y0S0−Y1S1 > 0)
denote the harm rate of treatment T on primary outcome Y . Let HRs0,s1(S → Y |T =
t) = P (Yts0 − Yts1 > 0) denote the harm rate of surrogate S of two specific levels s0,
s1, on primary endpoint Y given treatment T = t. When surrogate S is binary, we
simplify the notation HRs0,s1(S → Y |T = t) as HR(S → Y |T = t). For a good
surrogate, if the majority of individuals get a beneficial treatment effect on surrogate
and a beneficial surrogate effect on the primary endpoint, then it is expected that the
majority of individuals would get a beneficial treatment effect on the primary end-
point. Otherwise, paradoxical result happens on the individual level. Formally, we
define the individual surrogate paradox as below for any given constants 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1.
Definition 1 Under the conditions that (i) the proportion of individuals who have a
worse surrogate endpoint under the treatment T is no greater than c1, i.e., HR(T →
S) = P (S0−S1 > 0) ≤ c1, and (ii) the proportion of individuals that surrogate S does
harm to primary outcome Y is no greater than c2 , i.e., HRs0,s1(S → Y |T = t) =
P (Yts0 − Yts1 > 0) ≤ c2 for any s1 > s0 and t = 0, 1, then, the individual surrogate
paradox is present if (iii) the proportion of individuals that treatment T does harm to
primary outcome Y is greater than c1 + c2, i.e., HR(T → Y ) = P (Y0S0 − Y1S1 > 0) >
c1 + c2.
In Definition 1 (iii), the threshold of HR(T → Y ) is chosen as c1 + c2, however,
this threshold can be generalized to any number 0 ≤ c˜ ≤ 1, and our proposed meth-
ods can be generalized easily. For the discussion in this paper, we only focus on
the individual surrogate paradox with threshold c1 + c2 for HR(T → Y ). That is,
the individual surrogate paradox manifests if there are more individuals get harmful
treatment effect on primary outcome than the total number of individuals who have
a harmful treatment effect on surrogate and of those who have a harmful surrogate
effect on primary outcome.
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The surrogate paradox given in Definition 1 directly compares the two potential
outcomes (e.g., Y0 and Y1) of the same individual and focuses on the scenario that
one is better than the other. In contrast, Chen et al. (2007) defined the surrogate
paradox based on the average causal effect and Ju and Geng (2010) defined that
based on difference between distributions, both of which are population measures.
At the end of this section, we will show that even when both the ACE and the DCE
surrogate paradox are avoided, the individual surrogate paradox can still manifest.
Since the harm rate HR(T → Y ) is between 0 and 1, we further restrict the
range of c2 as 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1− c1. A special case of the individual surrogate paradox is
when c1 = c2 = 0, that is, for everyone, neither the treatment does any harm to the
surrogate endpoint nor the surrogate does any harm to the primary endpoint, but the
treatment does harm to the primary outcome for some people. This special case has a
nice feature that if a surrogate does not suffer from the individual surrogate paradox
for a population, then it does not suffer from such paradox for any the subpopulations.
Hence, whether the individual surrogate paradox manifests can be used as a new
criterion for evaluating surrogate endpoint and such criterion is consistent for all
the subpopulations. Equivalently, under this criterion, if a surrogate is not a good
surrogate for a subgroup, then it is not a good surrogate for any bigger population. In
comparison, a good surrogate in terms of avoiding either the ACE or DCE surrogate
paradox (Chen et al., 2007; Ju and Geng, 2010) on one population does not have any
indication of whether this is a good surrogate on any subpopulations. Furthermore,
if the individual surrogate paradox with c1 = c2 = 0 is excluded, then the surrogate
paradox based on ACE is guaranteed to be absent as well.
Now, we give an example that even when both the ACE and the DCE surrogate
paradoxes are absent, the individual surrogate paradox can still manifest. For simplic-
ity, we construct an example where surrogate S and outcome Y are both binary. In the
binary case, DCE and ACE are equivalent. As a non-negative individual causal effect
for everyone implies a non-negative average causal effect, we only need to construct
an example such that (1) treatment has a non-negative individual causal effect on sur-
rogate, (2) surrogate has a non-negative individual causal effect on primary outcome,
and (3) on average, the treatment has a non-negative ACE on primary outcome, but
(4) for some individuals, treatment has a negative individual causal effect on the pri-
mary outcome. To construct such example, we need to specify the joint probabilities
of potential outcomes. There are 4 potential outcomes for the primary endpoint Yts for
t = 0, 1 and s = 0, 1 and 16 different possible values of the vector (Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11).
Additionally, there are 2 potential outcomes for surrogate St for t = 0, 1, and 4 dif-
ferent possible values for (S0, S1). Thus, we have 16×4 = 64 different possible values
for the vector (Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1). For ease of illustration, let qi,j ≥ 0 denote
the proportion of getting each possible value of (Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11, S0, S1) in the whole
population for i = 0, . . . , 15 and j = 0, . . . , 3 (shown in Table 1 in the Supplemen-
tary Materials). Under conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 1 with c1 = c2 = 0, we
can reduce the 64 categories to 27 categories since the others are all 0 as shown in
Table 2. For example, since HR(T → S) = P (S1 = 0, S0 = 1) =
∑15
i=0 qi,2 = 0, we
have q0,2 = q1,2 = . . . = q15,2 = 0. The following example demonstrates that the
absence of surrogate paradoxes based on ACE and DCE cannot exclude the existence
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of individual surrogate paradox.
Example 1 When the surrogate S and the outcome Y are both binary, the probability
of qi,j is given in Table 3, then, the surrogate paradoxes based on ACE and DCE are
both absent while individual surrogate paradox manifests.
We have HR(T → S) = 0, and HR(S → Y |T = t) = 0 for t = 0, 1, but
HR(T → Y ) = P (YT=0 = 1, YT=1 = 0) = q4,3 + q12,0 + q12,1 + q12,3 + q13,0 = 0.235 > 0.
Additionally, we have ACE(T → Y ) = 0.03 > 0. Hence, both the surrogate paradoxes
based on ACE and DCE are absent but the individual surrogate paradox manifests.
As mentioned, both surrogate paradoxes based on ACE and DCE are based on pop-
ulation measures, while the individual surrogate paradox focuses on the individual
performance. Thus, it is not surprising that the absence of the formers cannot exclude
the presence of the latter.
3 Existing Criteria and Individual Surrogate Para-
dox
3.1 Prentice criterion
Prentice criterion requires that when given surrogate S, treatment T is independent of
outcome Y , that is, T⊥Y |S (Prentice, 1989). The intuition of this criterion is to have
the surrogate blocks all the association between treatment and primary endpoint.
The Prentice criterion is defined based on population distribution, but the individ-
ual surrogate paradox is defined from the perspective of individual. So intuitively,
Prentice criterion cannot guarantee the exclusion of this paradox.
Example 1 also serves as an counterexample with binary surrogate and outcome
that Prentice criterion cannot exclude the individual surrogate paradox when c1 =
c2 = 0. (See Supplementary materials for another counterexample with continuous
surrogate S and outcome Y ). For Example 1, we have already demonstrate that the
individual surrogate paradox manifests. To verify the Prentice criterion, we have
P (Y = 1|T = 0, S = 0) = q12,0 + q13,0 + q15,0 + q12,1 + q13,1 + q15,1∑
i(qi,0 + qi,1)
= 0.5,
P (Y = 1|T = 1, S = 0) = q3,0 + q7,0 + q15,0∑
i qi,0
= 0.5,
P (Y = 1|T = 0, S = 1) = q4,3 + q5,3 + q7,3 + q12,3 + q13,3 + q15,3∑
i qi,3
= 0.75,
P (Y = 1|T = 1, S = 1) =
∑
j=1,3 q1,j + q3,j + q5,j + q7,j + q13,j + q15,j∑
i(qi,1 + qi,3)
= 0.75.
Thus, we have P (Y = 1|T = 0, S = s) = P (Y = 1|T = 1, S = s) for s = 0, 1 and the
Prentice criterion holds, i.e., Y⊥T |S.
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3.2 Principle surrogate criterion
Principle surrogate requires YT=0 and YT=1 to be identically distributed under the
principle strata S0 = S1, i.e., P (YT=0|S0 = S1 = s) = P (YT=1|S0 = S1 = s),
for all s (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002). This criterion is based on the distribution
of each potential outcomes in this strata rather than comparing the two potential
outcomes of the same individual directly. So intuitively, principle surrogate cannot
avoid the paradox. We present one counterexample below when c1 = c2 = 0 for
binary surrogate and outcome. Another counterexample of continuous variables are
given in the Supplementary Materials.
Example 2 When surrogate S and outcome Y are both binary, the probabilities of
the joint potential outcomes qi,j are given in Table 4 in the Supplementary Materi-
als. Then, the principle surrogate criterion holds while individual surrogate paradox
manifests.
Specifically, we have

P (YT=0 = 1|S0 = S1 = 0) = q12,0 + q13,0 + q15,0∑
i qi,0
= 1/3,
P (YT=1 = 1|S0 = S1 = 0) = q3,0 + q7,0 + q15,0∑
i qi,0
= 1/3,
P (YT=0 = 1|S0 = S1 = 1) = q4,3 + q5,3 + q7,3 + q12,3 + q13,3 + q15,3∑
i qi,3
= 3/10,
P (YT=1 = 1|S0 = S1 = 1) = q1,3 + q3,3 + q5,3 + q7,3 + q13,3 + q15,3∑
i qi,3
= 3/10.
Therefore, P (YT=0 = 1|S0 = S1 = s) = P (YT=1 = 1|S0 = S1 = s) for s = 0, 1,
indicating S is a principle surrogate. On the other hand, HR(T → S) = HR(S →
Y |T = t) = 0 for t = 0, 1, and HR(T → Y ) = P (YT=0 = 1, YT=1 = 0) = q4,3 + q12,0 +
q12,1 + q12,3 + q13,0 = 0.235 > 0. Hence, the individual surrogate paradox manifests.
3.3 Strong Surrogate Criterion
Lauritzen (2004) defined a surrogate S to be a strong surrogate when there is no
direct path between treatment T and primary outcome Y without going through
surrogate S. (Figure 1). Under this condition, potential outcome Yts can be simply
written as Ys. Hence, we have HRs0,s1(S → Y |T = t) = P (Ys1 − Ys0 > 0), which we
simplify as HRs0,s1(S → Y ) and further simplify as HR(S → Y ) for binary surrogate
S. Chen et al. (2007) showed that the strong surrogate cannot avoid the surrogate
paradox based on ACE. We demonstrate that a strong binary surrogate can avoid the
individual surrogate paradox without any additional assumptions. To see this, note
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Figure 1. Causal diagram of the strong surrogate S for the effect of the treatment
T on outcome Y
we have that
HR(T → Y ) = P (YS0 − YS1 > 0)
= P (YS0=0 − YS1=1 > 0, S1 = 1, S0 = 0) + P (YS0 − YS1 > 0|S1 < S0)P (S1 < S0)
= P (YS=0 − YS=1 > 0)P (S1 = 1, S0 = 0|YS=0 − YS=1 > 0)
+P (YS0 − YS1 > 0|S1 < S0)P (S1 < S0)
≤ P (YS=0 − YS=1 > 0) + P (S1 < S0) ≤ c1 + c2,
where the first equation is due to the strong surrogate assumption, and the second
equation is obtained by the total probability theorem. That is, strong binary surrogate
will never encounter the individual surrogate paradox. This makes a nice feature of
the strong surrogate.
Unfortunately, for non-binary surrogate, even the strong surrogate criterion can-
not exclude the individual surrogate paradox. In the Supplementary Material, we
present a counterexample that when S has three levels of possible values, under
strong surrogate condition, individual surrogate paradox may still manifest.
3.4 Wu and VanderWeele Criteria
Let f(s, t) denote the expectation E(Y |S = s, T = t) of Y conditional on S = s and
T = t. Wu et al. (2011) proposed the following criterion to exclude the surrogate
paradoxes based on ACE and DCE.
Criterion (Wu et al., 2011): A surrogate S should satisfies the following
conditions:
1. f(s, 1) or f(s, 0) monotonically increases as s increases (i.e. f(s′, 1) ≥ f(s′′, 1)
for all s′ > s′′ or f(s′, 0) ≥ f(s′′, 0) for all s′ > s′′), and
2. f(s, 1) ≥ f(s, 0) for all s.
This criterion is also based on the observed data distribution, so intuitively, it
cannot exclude the individual surrogate paradox. We show in the Supplementary
material that Example 1 serves as a counterexample that Wu criterion cannot exclude
the individual surrogate paradox when S and Y are both binary.
VanderWeele (2013) provided the following sufficient conditions to avoid the sur-
rogate paradox with a non-strong surrogate.
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Figure 2. Causal diagram of the strong surrogate S for the effect of the treatment
T on outcome Y
Criterion (VanderWeele, 2013): A surrogate should satisfies the following
conditions: (a) E(Y |t, s, w) is non-decreasing in t and s for all w and (b) P (S > s|t, w)
is non-decreasing in t for all s, w.
VanderWeele criterion is also based on population measures, thus, it cannot ex-
clude the individual surrogate paradox (see supplementary material). Since the surro-
gate criterion of VanderWeele (2013) is more general than those in Chen et al. (2007)
and Ju and Geng (2010), counterexample for VanderWeele criterion also serves as an
counterexample to show that criteria in Chen et al. (2007) and Ju and Geng (2010)
cannot exclude the individual surrogate paradox.
4 New Criteria for the Individual Surrogate Para-
dox
In this section, we propose several criteria to exclude as well as to confirm the presence
of the individual surrogate paradox. As discussed, if a binary surrogate is a strong
surrogate, then the individual surrogate paradox will not manifest. Unfortunately, the
strong surrogate assumption may be less plausible in some scenarios. For example,
when evaluating the effectiveness of chemotherapy, 6-months progression status can
be used as surrogate endpoint for overall survival, however, the chemotherapy can
also affect the survival via side effects such as damaging cells in the heart, kidneys,
bladder, lungs, and nervous system. Hence, the 6-months progression status is a
non-strong surrogate. That is, treatment T can directly have an effect on outcome Y
instead of going through surrogate S (see Figure 2). Additionally, it is also of interest
to exclude as well as to confirm the presence of the individual surrogate paradox for
non-binary surrogate.
We first give a necessary condition for the presence of individual surrogate para-
dox. In Example 1, we have P (YT=1,S1 − YT=0,S1 < 0) = 0.25 > 0. Actually, it can be
shown that P (YT=1,S1 − YT=0,S1 < 0) > 0 is a necessary condition for the individual
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surrogate paradox to happen with c1 = c2 = 0. Note we have
P (YT=0 − YT=1 > 0) = P (YT=0,S0 − YT=1,S1 > 0)
= P (YT=0,S0 − YT=1,S1 > 0|S1 ≥ S0)
= P (YT=0,S0 − YT=0,S1 + YT=0,S1 − YT=1,S1 > 0|S1 ≥ S0)
= P (YT=0,S1 − YT=1,S1 > YT=0,S1 − YT=0,S0|S1 ≥ S0)
≤ P (YT=0,S1 − YT=1,S1 > 0|S1 ≥ S0)
= P (YT=1,S1 − YT=0,S1 < 0|S1 ≥ S0)
= P (YT=1,S1 − YT=0,S1 < 0).
The second and the last equation come from the fact that T does no harm to
S, i.e., P (S1 ≥ S0) = 1. The inequality holds because S does no harm to Y , i.e.,
HR(S → Y |T = t) = P (YT=0,s1 − YT=0,s0 < 0) = 0 for any s1 > s0 and hence
P (YT=0,S1−YT=0,S0 < 0|S1 > S0) = 0. The above derivation indicates that only when
there exist individuals that the direct causal effect from T to Y is negative, can we
obtain P (YT=0− YT=1 > 0) > 0, which leads to individual surrogate paradox. Hence,
the condition P (YT=1,S1 − YT=0,S1 < 0) = 0 can be used as a sufficient condition
for the exclusion of individual surrogate paradox. However, it is hard to verify this
using the observed data. Below, we explore more practical criteria for excluding the
individual surrogate paradox.
For ease of illustration, we first only focus on the case where both surrogate
and primary outcome are binary. To exclude or confirm the presence of individual
surrogate paradox, we first derive the sharp bound of HR(T → Y ) under the condition
that the proportion of individuals that have a negative treatment effect on surrogate
is no greater than c1, i.e., HR(T → S) ≤ c1 and the proportion of individuals that
have a negative surrogate effect on the primary outcome is no greater than c2 for both
treatment arms, i.e., HR(S → Y |T = t) = P (Yt0 = 1, Yt1 = 0) ≤ c2 for t = 0, 1. We
have the following Proposition for binary surrogate S and outcome Y .
Proposition 1 Given P (Y, S|T ), suppose HR(T → S) ≤ c1 and HR(S → Y |T =
t) ≤ c2 for t = 0, 1, then, the sharp bound of HR(T → Y ) is L ≤ HR(T → Y ) ≤ U,
where
L = max

L1
L2
L3
L4
 = max

0
P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0)− P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 1)− c1
P (Y = 0|T = 1)− P (Y = 0|T = 0)
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 1)− P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0)− c1
 ,
U = min

U1
U2
U3
U4
 = min

P (Y = 1|T = 0)
c1 + P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) + P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 1)
P (Y = 0|T = 1)
1 + c1 − P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0)− P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 1)
 .
Bounds in Proposition 1 are obtained using linear programming by considering the
joint distributions of potential outcomes. Since both L and U only involve observed
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data distribution, they can be calculated using the available data. An observation
yields that L1, L3, U1, U3 are simple bounds, in the sense that one can derive them
without the conditions that HR(T → S) ≤ c1 and HR(S → Y |T = t) ≤ c2 for
t = 0, 1. For example, we have HR(T → Y ) = P (YT=1 = 0, YT=0 = 1) ≥ P (YT=1 =
0) + P (YT=0 = 1)− 1 = P (Y = 0|T = 1)− P (Y = 0|T = 0) = L3.
Surprisingly, once given P (Y, S|T ) and HR(T → S) ≤ c1, the sharp bound of
HR(T → Y ) does not dependent on c2. That is, given P (Y, S|T ) and HR(T → S) ≤
c1, HR(T → Y ) does not change whether or not we collect HR(S → Y |T = t). To
see this, note that HR(T → Y ) = P (Y0S0 = 1, Y1S1 = 0), and HR(S → Y |T = t) =
P (Yt0 = 1, Yt1 = 0). That is, HR(T → Y ) involves the joint distribution of potential
outcomes with different treatment values, but HR(S → Y |T = t) involve the joint
distribution of potential outcomes of the same treatment value. Hence, intuitively, the
bounds of HR(T → Y ) is free of c2. We present a rigorous proof in the Supplementary
Materials. Since the sharp bound does not depend on c2, it is reasonable to modify
the definition of individual surrogate paradox as follows.
Definition 2 The individual surrogate paradox is present if the treatment harm rate
of T on S is no greater than c1, i.e., HR(T → S) = P (S0 = 1, S1 = 0) ≤ c1, however,
the treatment harm rate of T on Y is greater than c1, i.e., HR(T → Y ) = P (Y0S0 =
1, Y1S1 = 0) > c1.
According to Definition 2, the individual surrogate paradox manifests if there are
more individuals that have a harmful treatment effect on primary outcome as com-
pared with those have a harmful treatment effect on surrogate. Based on Proposition
1, we propose a criterion to exclude or conclude the presence of individual surrogate
paradox when S and Y are both binary.
Criterion 1 (1) The individual surrogate paradox can be excluded if U = min(U1, U2, U3, U4) ≤
c1; (2) the individual surrogate paradox is guaranteed to manifest if L = max(L1, L2, L3, L4) >
c1.
Criterion 1 provides a feasible way to assess the presence of individual surrogate
paradox as both U and L only involve observed data. As we show in the Supplemen-
tary Materials, the bounds proposed in Proposition 1 are sharp. As a consequence,
the conditions (1) and (2) in Criterion 1 are both sufficient and “almost necessary”
(Yin et al., 2017b) to exclude or conclude the presence of individual surrogate para-
dox. That is, if (1) (or (2)) is satisfied, the individual surrogate paradox is guaranteed
to be absent (or present); if (1) (or (2)) is not satisfied, then there exists another data
generating mechanism, or joint density, that has (or does not have) the individual
surrogate paradox and yields the same observed data. That is, Criterion 1 has ex-
tracted the most information from the observed data with regards to the existence
of individual surrogate paradox. A more thorough discussion of the sufficient and
almost necessary property could be found in Yin et al. (2017b).
As mentioned above, upper bounds U1, U3 are simple bounds and the upper bound
U is non-trivial when U2 ≤ min(U1, U3) or U4 ≤ min(U1, U3). This is equivalent to
one of the two sets of the following inequalities holds:
11
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2
(c) Scenario 1 (d) Scenario 2
Figure 3. Two possible scenarios of piecewise linear functions for the upper bound
U (top two figures), and lower bound L (lower two figures)
{
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) < P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 1),
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 1) < P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0);{
P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 1) < P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0),
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) < P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 1).
Furthermore, U is a piecewise linear function of c1, with slope either 0 or 1.
When c1 = 1, we have min{U1(c1), U3(c1)} < min{U2(c1), U4(c1)}. Thus, only two
scenarios would occur, as shown in Figures 3(a)–3(b). The curve of U(c1) is either
a horizontal line (Scenario 1) or a broken line of two segments with slopes 1 and
0, respectively (Scenario 2). By Criterion 1, individual surrogate paradox can be
excluded if U(c1) ≤ c1. That is, when the red line intersects with or is above the blue
line in Figures 3(a)–3(b), individual surrogate paradox can be excluded.
As for lower bound, L1, L3 are simple bounds and L is non-trivial when L2 ≥
max(L1, L3) or L4 ≥ max(L1, L3). This is equivalent to one of the two sets of the
following inequalities holds:{
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) < P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 1),
P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 1) < P (Y = 1, S = 1|T = 0);
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{
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 1) < P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0),
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) < P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 1).
Similar to the case for the upper bound, the lower bound L is also a piecewise
linear function of c1, with slope either 0 or −1. And only two scenarios would occur
which are depicted in Figures 3(c)–3(d). By Criterion 1, individual surrogate paradox
is guaranteed to be present if L(c1) > c1. That is, when the red line is below the
blue line in Figures 3(c)–3(d), the presence of individual surrogate paradox can be
concluded from the observed data.
Although the bounds in Proposition 1 are obtained for binary surrogate and out-
come, similar methods can be easily extended to the case where surrogate and out-
come are multi-level variables. Once we obtain the bounds, the criterion to exclude
or conclude the presence of individual surrogate paradox can be obtained in the same
fashion.
The bounds obtained in Proposition 1 can be wide since no additional information
is incorporated. Conditions could be further imposed to tighten the bound and hence
increase power for the corresponding criteria. For illustration, we impose an additional
assumption that is motivated by the causal necessity condition. Recall that Frangakis
and Rubin (2002) proposed the causal necessity condition as follows.
Definition 3 (Causal Necessity) Assume T does not affect Y if T does not affect
S, i.e., if S(0) = S(1), then Y (0) = Y (1).
Causal Necessity states that the treatment T can affect primary outcome Y only
through surrogate S. But here we generalize this idea. We set 0 ≤ c3 ≤ 1 as the
proportion of the individuals that do not conform causal necessity. That is,
Condition 1 Assume the proportion of individuals that have the same surrogate un-
der treatment and control but different primary outcome is no greater than c3, i.e.,
P (S1 = S0, Y1S1 6= Y0S0) ≤ c3.
The causal necessity condition is a special case of the Condition 1 when c3 = 0. While
causal necessity excludes any one from having a non-null treatment effect on primary
outcome if there is no treatment effect on surrogate endpoint, Condition 1 allows a
small proportion of violation. We update our bounds under Condition 1 to gain more
power.
Proposition 2 Given P (Y, S|T ) and assume Condition 1 holds, if HR(T → S) ≤
c1 and P (S1 = S0, Y1S1 6= Y0S0) ≤ c3, then L ≤ HR(T → Y ) ≤ U˜, where L =
max(L1, L2, L3, L4), U˜ = min(U˜1, . . . , U˜15), and the formula of U˜1, . . . , U˜15 is given
in the Supplementary material.
Similar as in Proposition 1, both L and U˜ only involve observed data distribution,
thus, they can be calculated. It can also be shown that U˜ ≤ U , hence, the upper
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bound is tighter under additional Assumption 1. Interestingly, the incorporation of
Condition 1 only shrink the upper bound with the lower bound unchanged.
According to Proposition 2, we have the following criterion to exclude or conclude
the existence of individual surrogate paradox.
Criterion 2 If Condition 1 holds, then (1) the individual surrogate paradox can be ex-
cluded if observed distribution P (Y, S|T ) satisfies U˜ = min(U˜1, . . . , U˜15) ≤ c1; (2) the
individual surrogate paradox is guaranteed to manifest if L = max(L1, L2, L3, L4) >
c1.
5 Data analysis
Diabetic retinopathy is caused by damage to the blood vessels in the light sensitive
tissue at the back of the eye (retina). It is a leading cause of vision loss among people
with diabetes and the major cause of vision damage and blindness among working-
age adults. The ACCORD study enrolled 10,251 participants with type 2 diabetes
who were at high risk for cardiovascular disease to randomly receive either intensive
or standard treatment for glycemia (target glycated hemoglobin level, < 6.0% or 7.0
to 7.9%, respectively, The ACCORD Study Group and ACCORD Eye Study Group,
2010). The ACCORD Eye study aimed at determining the effect of the intensive
glycemia on the risk of development or progression of diabetic retinopathy. Among
all the ACCORD participants, 2856 were eligible for the ACCORD Eye study. Since
the inclusion criteria did not affect the intervention, we still consider the ACCORD
Eye study as a randomized trial.
Let Y = 0 if the progression of diabetic retinopathy was observed, and Y = 1
otherwise. Let S denote the glycated hemoglobin level. We set S = 1 if it was
smaller than 6% at one year follow-up time and S = 0 otherwise. Moreover, let
T = 1 if the patient gets intensive treatment and T = 0 otherwise.
We first calculate the bound of HR(T → Y ) without any additional assumptions.
By Proposition 1, the bound of HR(T → Y ) is [0.033, 0.105] and the bound does not
change with c1. Using bootstrap, we obtain the 95% uncertainty region (confidence
interval for bounds, see more in Richardson et al. (2014)) of HR(T → Y ) as [0.011,
0.119]. That is, under 95% confidence level, for any c1 > 0.119, if the proportion of
individuals that have glycated hemoglobin level increased to > 6% in one year follow
up due to intensive treatment is less than c1, then, no more than c1 proportion of
individuals will get progression of diabetic retinopathy due to the intensive treatment.
On the other hand, under 95% confidence level, for any c1 < 0.011, even if the
proportion of individuals that have glycated hemoglobin level increased to > 6% in
one year follow up due to intensive treatment is less than c1, more than c1 proportion
of the population will get progression of diabetic retinopathy due to the intensive
treatment.
Under Condition 1, we calculate the upper bound of HR(T → Y ) for different
values of c3 since lower bound is unchanged under this additional condition. As
shown in Figure 4(a), when c3 = 0, i.e., causal necessity holds, by Proposition 2, we
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(a) c3=0 (b) c3=0.02
(c) c3=0.05 (d) c3=0.1
Figure 4. Curves of U(c1) with different values of c3
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have U˜ = 0.046 + c1 for c1 ≤ 0.022, and U˜ = 0.068 otherwise. The 95% uncertainty
region is [0.025+c1, 0.067+c1] for c1 ≤ 0.022 and [0.047, 0.089] otherwise. Thus,
when c1 > 0.089, under 95% confidence level, the individual surrogate paradox can
be excluded, i.e., there is no more individual get progression of diabetic retinopathy
due to the intensive treatment than those who have a harmful treatment effect on
the glycated hemoglobin level. A comparison with the bounds without the causal
necessity reveals that the incorporation of causal necessity shrinks the upper bound
significantly. As shown in Figure 4(b), when c3 = 0.02, the upper bound inflates to
U˜ = 0.066 + c1 for c1 ≤ 0.022, and U˜ = 0.088 otherwise. The 95% uncertainty region
is [0.045+c1, 0.089+c1] and [0.067, 0.111], respectively. Hence, relaxing the causal
necessity condition makes it harder to exclude the individual surrogate paradox. As
shown in Figure 4(c), when c3 = 0.05, we have U˜ = 0.096 + c1 when c1 ≤ 0.009, and
U˜ = 0.105 otherwise. The 95% uncertainty region is [0.079+c1, 0.113+c1] and [0.088,
0.122]. Finally, when c3 ≥ 0.059, the generalized causal necessity assumption can
no longer further shrink the bounds as compared to those without the assumption.
Hence, the bounds are [0.033, 0.105] with 95% uncertainty region [0.011, 0.119] (see
Figure 4(d)), which is the same as the result we obtain from Proposition 1.
6 Discussion
Compared to the surrogate paradoxes based on ACE and DCE, the individual sur-
rogate paradox we proposed focuses more on the individuals. In this paper, we pro-
pose criterion to exclude the individual surrogate paradox based on sharp bounds
of HR(T → Y ). However, without any assumptions, the bounds may be wide since
it accommodates all the possible scenarios and hence the criterion may not have
enough power to exclude the paradox. To increase power of our criteria, we impose
a generalized causal necessity assumption. Such assumption facilitates the exclusion
of individual surrogate paradox but does not change the conclusion of the existence
of such paradox. Other assumptions may be imposed to further influence both the
lower and upp er bounds. We leave that as future research topic. We also leave the
exclusion of non-strong surrogate in the continuous case as a future research topic.
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Supplementary Materials
Additional Counterexample for Prentice Criterion
The following example illustrates that the Prentice criterion cannot exclude the exis-
tence of individual surrogate paradox in the continuous case.
Example 3 When surrogate S and outcome Y are both continuous, assume the fol-
lowing model holds:
Y = α0 + α1T + α2S + α3W + 1,
S = β0 + β1T + β2W + 2,
1 ∼ N(0, 1), 2 ∼ N(0, 1), W ∼ N(0, 1), (1, 2)⊥(T, S,W ), 1⊥2.
(1)
If β1 > 0, α2 > 0, α1(1 + β
2
2) − α3β1β2 = 0 and α1 + α2β1 < 0, then, the individual
surrogate paradox manifests while Prentice criterion is satisfied.
There are many choices of parameter values that satisfy the conditions in Example
3. For example, we set the parameter value as α1 = −2, α2 = 1, α3 = −4, β1 =
1, β2 = 1. We first show that the Prentice criterion holds. When β1 > 0, T does
no harm to S, i.e., HR(T → S) = 0. When α2 > 0, S does no harm to Y , i.e.,
HRs0,s1(S → Y |T = t) > 0. We prove at the end of Supplementary Materials that
given (T, S), the distribution of Y is
Y |(T, S) ∼ N
{
µ(T, S),
1 + β22
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
,
where µ(t, s) =
[{
(1 + β22)α0 − α3β0β2
}
+
{
α1(1 + β
2
2) − α3β1β2
}
t +
{
α2(1 + β
2
2) +
α3β2
}
s
]
/(1 + β22). When α1(1 + β
2
2) − α3β1β2 = 0, we have Y⊥S|T , which means
Prentice criterion holds. On the other hand, model (1) indicates that
Y = (α0 + α2β0) + (α1 + α2β1)T + (α3 + α2β2)W + (1 + α22),
hence, YT=1 − YT=0 = α1 + α2β1. When α1 + α2β1 < 0, there exist individuals who
has a negative treatment effect on primary outcome Y , i.e., HR(T → Y ) > 0. This
implies when S and Y are continuous, Prentice criterion cannot avoid the individual
surrogate paradox.
Additional counterexample for principal surrogate criterion
Example 4 When surrogate S and outcome Y are both continuous, assume the fol-
lowing model holds:
Y = α0 + α1S + α2W + (2T − 1)1,
S = β0 + β1T + β2W + 2,
1 ∼ N(0, 1), 2 ∼ N(0, 1), W ∼ N(0, 1), (1, 2)⊥(T, S,W ), 1⊥2.
(2)
If β1 > 0, α1 > 0, then, principle surrogate criterion holds whereas individual surro-
gate paradox manifests.
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The difference between this model and model (1) is that in this model, the effect
of T on Y is on a error variable 1, but the effect of T on Y in model (1) is on the
interception. When β1 > 0, T does no harm to S for any individual, i.e., HR(T →
S) = 0. When α1 > 0, S does no harm to Y for any individual, i.e., HRs0,s1(S →
Y |T = t) = 0. Note
P (YT |S0 = S1 = s)
=
∫
P (YT |S0 = S1 = s,W = w)P (W = w|S0 = S1 = s)du
=
∫
P (α0 + α1s+ α2u+ (2T − 1)1|S0 = S1 = s,W = w)P (W = w|S0 = S1 = s)du,
we also have
{α0 + α1s+ α2u+ (2T − 1)1}|(S0 = S1 = s,W = w) ∼ N(α0 + α1s+ α2u, 1),
for t = 0, 1. Hence, we have P (YT=0|S0 = S1 = s) = P (YT=1|S0 = S1 = s), which
indicates that under model (2), S is a principle surrogate.
On the other hand, according to model (2), we have:
Y = (α0 + α1β0) + α1β1T + (α2 + α1β2)W + (2T − 1)1 + α12.
Hence HR(T → Y ) = P (YT=0 − YT=1 > 0) = P (−α1β1 − 21 > 0) = Φ(−α1β1/2),
where Φ(·) is the function of standard normal distribution. Set α1 = β1 = 1, we obtain
T does no harm to S and S does no harm to Y , but HR(T → Y ) = Φ(−1/2) > 0.
Hence, the individual surrogate paradox manifests.
Counterexample for strong surrogate criterion
Example 5 When S takes value of 0, 1, 2 and Y is binary. We assume S is a
strong surrogate in this case. Then, we have 32 × 23 = 72 different possible values
for the vector (S0, S1, Y0, Y1, Y2). Let qi,j ≥ 0 denote the proportion of getting each
possible value of (S0, S1, Y0, Y1, Y2) in the whole population for i = 0, . . . , 8 and j =
0, . . . , 7 (shown in Table 5 in the Supplementary Materials). We have HR(T → S) =∑
i=3,6,7
∑8
j=0 qi,j, HR(S → Y ) = max(c21, c22, c23), where c21 = P (YS=0 > YS=1) =∑8
i=0
∑
j=4,5 qi,j, c22 = P (YS=0 > YS=2) =
∑8
i=0
∑
j=4,6 qi,j, c23 = P (YS=1 > YS=2) =∑8
i=0
∑
j=2,6 qi,j. And HR(T → S) = P (YT=0 = 1, YT=1 = 0) = q6,1+q7,1+q3,2+q5,2+
q3,3+q6,3+q1,4+q2,4+q1,5+q7,5+q2,6+q5,6. Let q5,2 = q1,4 = q2,4 = q1,5 = q2,6 = q5,6 =
1/6, and qi,j = 0 otherwise. Then, we have HR(T → S) = 0, HR(S → Y ) = 2/3, but
HR(T → Y ) = 1 > HR(T → S) + HR(S → Y ). Thus, individual surrogate manifests.
Counterexample for Wu and VanderWeele Criteria
We use example 1 as the counterexample for Wu Criterion. From Table 3, we have
f(1, 1) = P (Y = 1|S = 1, T = 1) = 0.75, f(1, 0) = P (Y = 1|S = 1, T = 0) = 0.75,
f(0, 1) = P (Y = 1|S = 0, T = 1) = 0.5, and f(0, 0) = P (Y = 1|S = 0, T = 0) = 0.5.
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Hence, we have f(1, 1) ≥ f(0, 1), f(1, 0) ≥ f(0, 0), f(0, 1) = f(0, 0), f(1, 1) = f(1, 0)
satisfying the condition of Wu et al. (2011). However, we have HR(T→ Y) = 0.235 >
0. Thus, individual surrogate paradox manifests.
To verify VanderWeele criterion cannot exclude the individual surrogate paradox,
we consider a slightly modified version of example 1. When both S and Y are binary,
we have HR(T → Y ) = P (YT=0 = 1, YT=1 = 0) = q4,3 + q12,0 + q12,1 + q12,3 + q13,0.
Assume W is binary with P (W = 1) = P (W = 0) = 0.5 and the joint distribution of
(S0, S1, Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11)|W = w the same as the probabilities in given in Table 3 for
w = 0, 1. For example, assume P (Y00 = 1, S0 = 0|W = w) = P (Y00 = 1, S0 = 0) =
0.3. Then, we have
P (Y = 1|T = 0, S = 0,W = w) = P (Y00 = 1, S0 = 0|W = w)
P (S0 = 0|W = w) = 0.5,
P (Y = 1|T = 1, S = 0,W = w) = P (Y10 = 1, S1 = 0|W = w)
P (S1 = 0|W = w) = 0.5,
P (Y = 1|T = 0, S = 1,W = w) = P (Y01 = 1, S0 = 1|W = w)
P (S0 = 1|W = w) = 0.75,
P (Y = 1|T = 1, S = 1,W = w) = P (Y11 = 1, S1 = 1|W = w)
P (S1 = 1|W = w) = 0.75.
Therefore, condition (a) is satisfied. Additionally, we have P (S = 1|T = 0, w) =
0.4 ≤ 0.8 = P (S = 1|T = 1, w) satisfying condition (b). Since HR(T → Y ) =
P (YT=0 = 1, YT=1 = 0) = q4,3 + q12,0 + q12,1 + q12,3 + q13,0 = 0.235 > 0, T does harm
to Y for 23.5% of the individuals.
The proof of Proposition 1
When P (Y, S|T ) is known, we have the following restrictions on the distributional
parameters of the potential outcomes:
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0) =∑7i=0(qi,0 + qi,1),
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0) =∑i=0,1,2,3,8,9,10,11(qi,2 + qi,3),
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 0) =∑15i=8(qi,0 + qi,1),
P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 1) =∑i=0,1,4,5,8,9,12,13(qi,0 + qi,2),
P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 1) =∑i=0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14(qi,1 + qi,3),
P (Y = 1, S = 0|T = 1) =∑i=2,3,6,7,10,11,14,15(qi,0 + qi,2),
1 =
∑
i(qi,0 + qi,1 + qi,2 + qi,3),
(3)
Since we have
HR(T → S) = P (ST=0 = 1, ST=1 = 0) ≤ c1,
HR(S → Y |T = 0) = P (Y00 = 1, Y01 = 0) ≤ c2,
HR(S → Y |T = 1) = P (Y10 = 1, Y11 = 0) ≤ c2.
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Therefore, we have the following restrictions:
∑15
i=0 qi,2 + α = c1,∑
j=0,1,2,3(q8,j + q9,j + q10,j + q11,j) + β = c2,∑
j=0,1,2,3(q2,j + q6,j + q10,j + q14,j) + γ = c2,
α, β, γ ≥ 0,
qi,j ≥ 0, for any i, j.
(4)
Our aim is to determine the bound of HR(T → Y ) = q8,0 + q9,0 + q12,0 + q13,0 +
q8,1 + q10,1 + q12,1 + q14,1 + q4,2 + q5,2 + q12,2 + q13,2 + q4,3 + q6,3 + q12,3 + q14,3. Let−→q = (q0,0, q1,0, . . . , q15,0, q1,0, . . . , q15,3,
α, β, γ)′, b = (P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 0), P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 0), P (Y = 1, S =
0|T = 0), P (Y = 0, S = 0|T = 1), P (Y = 0, S = 1|T = 1), P (Y = 1, S = 0|T =
1), 1, c1, c2, c2)
′, c = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)′. Denote A′ = (B′, C ′, D′, E ′),
where
B =

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0

, C =

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

,
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D =

0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0

, E =

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

.
Then we can represent the constraint (3) as A−→q = b. Note that HR(T → Y ) =
c′−→q . Thus the our problem can be equivalently rewritten as a minimization problem
with linear constraints:
min c′−→q , s.t.
{
A−→q = b,−→q ≥ 0.
and
max c′−→q , s.t.
{
A−→q = b,−→q ≥ 0.
In order to get the solution of the problem, we consider its dual problem:
max b′−→p , s.t. A′−→p ≤ c. (5)
The set Q = {−→p |A′−→p ≤ c} is a polyhedron and the quality b′−→p reaches its extreme
value at the vertexes of the polyhedron Q. Since both A and c do not involve any
symbolics, we can enumerate all the vertexes {p1, · · · , pK} of Q. Thus, the solution
to the optimal problem (5) is LHR = max{b′p1, · · · , b′pK}. The bound can be attained
since all the vertexes belong to the set Q.
The proof of c2 does not affect the bound of HR(T → Y )
In order to prove c2 does not shink the bound of HR(T → Y ), we only need to prove
that even setting c2 = 0, the bound of HR(T → Y ) does not change as the bounds
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with smaller value of c2 are nested within those with a larger value of c2. From (4),
we know c2 = 0 is equivalent to:{ ∑
j=0,1,2,3(q8,j + q9,j + q10,j + q11,j) = 0,∑
j=0,1,2,3(q2,j + q6,j + q10,j + q14,j) = 0.
(6)
This indicates that all of qi,j in (6) should be 0. Since HR(T → Y ) = q8,0 + q9,0 +
q12,0 + q13,0 + q8,1 + q10,1 + q12,1 + q14,1 + q4,2 + q5,2 + q12,2 + q13,2 + q4,3 + q6,3 + q12,3 + q14,3,
c2 can affect HR(T → Y ) through q8,0, q8,1, q9,0, q10,1, q14,1, q6,3, q14,3.We show below
that after setting all the qi,j = 0 in (6), we can still find a set of {q˜i,j}, such that
HR(T → Y ) remains the same and satisfies (3).
Supposed that {qi,j} is a set of numbers satisfies (3) and (4). It is easy to verify
that after setting
q˜12,0 = q12,0 + q8,0,
q˜13,0 = q13,0 + q9,0,
q˜12,1 = q12,1 + q8,1 + q10,1 + q14,1,
q˜12,3 = q12,3 + q6,3 + q14,3,
q˜15,0 = q10,0 + q11,0 + q14,0 + q15,0,
q˜1,2 = q8,2 + q9,2 + q1,2,
q˜3,2 = q2,2 + q10,2 + q11,2 + q3,2,

q˜15,2 = q6,2 + q14,2 + q15,2,
q˜0,1 = q2,1 + q6,1 + q0,1,
q˜10,1 = q9,1 + q11,1 + q10,1,
q˜3,0 = q2,0 + q6,0 + q3,0,
q˜0,3 = q2,3 + q8,3 + q10,3 + q0,3,
q˜1,3 = q9,3 + q11,3 + q1,3,
HR(T → Y ) does not change. Additionally, such parameterization still satisfies (3)
and
∑15
i=0 qi,2 +α = c1, or equivalently, P (Y, S|T ) is unchanged and HR(T → S) ≤ c1
still holds. Hence for all x ∈ [L,U ], there exist a set of q˜i,j such that HR(T → Y ) = x
and it satisfies P (Y, S|T ) is unchanged and HR(T → S) ≤ c1 still holds. Therefore,
c2 does not affect the bound of HR(T→ Y).
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Formula for U˜1, . . . , U˜15
Let Pys|t = P (Y = y, S = s|T = t), then, we have that
U˜ = min(U˜1, . . . , U˜15)
T = min

P (Y = 0|T = 1)
P (Y = 1|T = 0)
c1 + P10|0 + P01|1
1 + c1 − P01|0 − P10|1
c1 + c3 − P01|0 + P01|1
c1 + c3 + P10|0 − P10|1
c3 + P11|0 + P01|1
c3 + P10|0 + P00|1
1 + c3 − P01|0 − P11|1
1 + c3 − P00|0 − P10|1
0.5c3 + c1 + 0.5P01|1 − 0.5P11|1 − 0.5P01|0 + 0.5P11|0
0.5 + c3 − 0.5P11|1 + 0.5P01|1 + 0.5P11|0 − 0.5P01|0
0.5 + 0.5c3 + 0.5P00|1 − 0.5P11|1 − 0.5P01|0 + 0.5P10|0
0.5 + 0.5c3 + 0.5P01|1 − 0.5P10|1 + 0.5P11|0 − 0.5P00|0
0.5 + 0.5c3 + 0.5P00|1 − 0.5P10|1 − 0.5P00|0 + 0.5P10|0

.
The distribution of P (Y |S, T ) under linear model (A.1)
According to model (1), we have
Y = α0 + α1T + α2S + α3W + 1,
S = β0 + β1T + β2W + 2,
1 ∼ N(0, 1), 2 ∼ N(0, 1), W ∼ N(0, 1), (1, 2)⊥(T, S,W ), 1⊥2.
(7)
Then, we can calculate the density of W given (S, T ) as
P (W = w|S = s, T = t) ∝ P (S = s|T = t,W = w)P (W = w)
∝ exp
{
− (s− β0 − β1t− β2w)
2
2
}
exp
{
− w
2
2
}
∝ exp
{
− (1 + β
2
2)w
2 − 2(s− β0 − β1t)β2w
2
}
∝ exp
{(1 + β22)(w − β2(s−β0−β1t)1+β22 )2
2
}
.
So we have W |(S, T ) ∼ N{β2(S − β0 − β1T )/(1 + β22), 1/(1 + β22)}.
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P (Y = y|S = s, T = t)
∝
∫
P (Y = y|S = s, T = t,W = w)P (W = w|S = s, T = t)dw
∝
∫
exp
{
− (y − α0 − α1t− α2s− α3w)
2
2
}
exp
{
(1 + β22)
(
w − β2(s− β0 − β1t)
1 + β22
)2}
dw
= exp
{
− (y − α0 − α1t− α2s)
2 + (s− β0 − β1t)2β22/(1 + β22)
2
}
·∫
exp
{
− (1 + β
2
2 + α
2
3)w
2 − 2[α3(y − α0 − α1t− α2s) + β2(s− β0 − β1t)]w
2
}
dw
= exp
{
− (y − α0 − α1t− α2s)
2 + (s− β0 − β1t)2β22/(1 + β22)
2
}
·∫
exp
{
− (1 + β
2
2 + α
2
3)
(
w − [α3(y − α0 − α1t− α2s) + β2(s− β0 − β1t)])2
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
dw ·
exp
{
− −
[
α3(y − α0 − α1t− α2s) + β2(s− β0 − β1t)
]2
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
∝ exp
{
− (y − α0 − α1t− α2s)
2 − [α3(y − α0 − α1t− α2s) + β2(s− β0 − β1t)]2
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
∝ exp
{
− (1 + β
2
2)y
2 − 2(α3β2(s− β0 − β1t) + (1 + β22)(α0 + α1t+ α2s))y
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
∝ exp
{
− (1 + β
2
2)
(
y − µ(t, s))2
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}
,
where µ(t, s) =
[{
(1 + β22)α0 − α3β0β2
}
+
{
α1(1 + β
2
2) − α3β1β2
}
t +
{
α2(1 + β
2
2) +
α3β2
)
s
]
/(1 + β22}. Hence, we have
Y |(T, S) ∼ N{µ(T, S), 1 + β
2
2
2(1 + β22 + α
2
3)
}.
Tables in the paper
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Table 1. The 64 categories of the subgroups when S and Y are binary and S is a
non-strong surrogate.
S0 = 0, S1 = 0 S0 = 0, S1 = 1 S0 = 1, S1 = 0 S0 = 1, S1 = 1
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 0) q0,0 q0,1 q0,2 q0,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 1) q1,0 q1,1 q1,2 q1,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 1, 0) q2,0 q2,1 q2,2 q2,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 1, 1) q3,0 q3,1 q3,2 q3,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 0) q4,0 q4,1 q4,2 q4,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 1) q5,0 q5,1 q5,2 q5,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 1, 0) q6,0 q6,1 q6,2 q6,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 1, 1) q7,0 q7,1 q7,2 q7,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 0, 0, 0) q8,0 q8,1 q8,2 q8,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 0, 0, 1) q9,0 q9,1 q9,2 q9,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 0, 1, 0) q10,0 q10,1 q10,2 q10,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 0, 1, 1) q11,0 q11,1 q11,2 q11,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 0) q12,0 q12,1 q12,2 q12,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 1) q13,0 q13,1 q13,2 q13,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 1, 0) q14,0 q14,1 q14,2 q14,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 1, 1) q15,0 q15,1 q15,2 q15,3
Table 2. The 27 categories of the subgroups when surrogate S and outcome Y are
binary, T is beneficial to S and S is beneficial to Y .
S0 = 0, S1 = 0 S0 = 0, S1 = 1 S0 = 1, S1 = 1
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 0) q0,0 q0,1 q0,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 1) q1,0 q1,1 q1,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 1, 1) q3,0 q3,1 q3,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 0) q4,0 q4,1 q4,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 1) q5,0 q5,1 q5,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 1, 1) q7,0 q7,1 q7,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 0) q12,0 q12,1 q12,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 1) q13,0 q13,1 q13,3
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 1, 1) q15,0 q15,1 q15,3
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Table 3. The counterexample of Prentice criterion when surrogate S and outcome
Y are binary.
S0 = 0, S1 = 0 S0 = 0, S1 = 1 S0 = 1, S1 = 1
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.01 0.015 0.055
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 1) 0.02 0.02 0.025
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.04 0.05 0.07
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 0) 0 0.015 0.05
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 1) 0 0.04 0.03
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 1, 1) 0.03 0.06 0.065
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.05 0.08 0.035
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 1) 0.02 0.07 0.045
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 1, 1) 0.03 0.05 0.075
Table 4. The counterexample of principle surrogate when surrogate S and outcome
Y are binary.
S0 = 0, S1 = 0 S0 = 0, S1 = 1 S0 = 1, S1 = 1
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.025 0.015 0.005
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 0, 1) 0.03 0.02 0.025
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 0, 1, 1) 0.04 0.05 0.06
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 0) 0.035 0.015 0.05
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 0, 1) 0.04 0.04 0.03
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (0, 1, 1, 1) 0.03 0.06 0.015
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 0) 0.05 0.08 0.035
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 0, 1) 0.02 0.07 0.025
(Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11) = (1, 1, 1, 1) 0.03 0.05 0.055
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Table 5. The table used by counterexample in Example 5.
(Y0, Y1, Y2)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
(S0 = 0, S1 = 0) q0,0 q0,1 q0,2 q0,3 q0,4 q0,5 q0,6 q0,7
(S0 = 0, S1 = 1) q1,0 q1,1 q1,2 q1,3 q1,4 q1,5 q1,6 q1,7
(S0 = 0, S1 = 2) q2,0 q2,1 q2,2 q2,3 q2,4 q2,5 q2,6 q2,7
(S0 = 1, S1 = 0) q3,0 q3,1 q3,2 q3,3 q3,4 q3,5 q3,6 q3,7
(S0 = 1, S1 = 1) q4,0 q4,1 q4,2 q4,3 q4,4 q4,5 q4,6 q4,7
(S0 = 1, S1 = 2) q5,0 q5,1 q5,2 q5,3 q5,4 q5,5 q5,6 q5,7
(S0 = 2, S1 = 0) q6,0 q6,1 q6,2 q6,3 q6,4 q6,5 q6,6 q6,7
(S0 = 2, S1 = 1) q7,0 q7,1 q7,2 q7,3 q7,4 q7,5 q7,6 q7,7
(S0 = 2, S1 = 2) q8,0 q8,1 q8,2 q8,3 q8,4 q8,5 q8,6 q8,7
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